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Abstract—This paper studies the impact of demand uncer-
tainty and competition on a firms technology selection decision
between Additive Manufacturing (AM) and conventional tool-
based Dedicated Manufacturing (DM). The paper uses the game-
theoretic approach presented in [57], and extends the model from
2 to n players making three sequential decisions under demand
uncertainty: (i) choice of technology, (ii) capacity investment,
and (iii) production quantities. We find that the conventional
wisdom of choosing between flexible manufacturing technology
and dedicated tool-based technology holds in the case of AM
given there is no demand uncertainty. However, once we take the
demand uncertainty into account, a game-theoretical analysis is
essential to examine the profitability of switching manufacturing
technologies to AM. The research will contribute towards a future
empirical study and will help develop an industrially accessible
decision support tool for the adoption of AM in a production
environment.
Index Terms—Additive Manufacturing; 3d Printing; Dedicated
Manufacturing; Tool-based Manufacturing; Game theory; Tech-
nology Choice; Technology Selection; Decision Support tool
I. INTRODUCTION
The global manufacturing sector is undergoing a tumultuous
change. While the20th century was about hundreds of products
selling millions of copies, the 21st century isabout millions of
products selling hundreds of copies.Customers and markets
are demanding increased product customisation, greater
product variety and frequent changes in batch sizes. As
an industry, manufacturing patterns are shifting awayfrom
identical mass production paradigm introduced by Henry
Ford towards more customised solutions.
There is an enormous pressure on all manufacturing busi-
nesses to be more responsive in the way they operate and re-
spond to disruptions. Disruptions are those sources of change,
which occur independently of the systems intentions [1]. These
disruptions are categorised into three broad areas [2]:
• Upstream (Supplier): Problems associated with materials
quality, delivery delays, incorrect deliveries
• Internal (Manufacturing System): Machine breakdowns,
production rate, quality, labour, operator errors.
• Downstream (Customer): Customisation requests, rush
orders due to demand variations (activity, seasonality,
marketing, competitors activity), changes to orders (quan-
tity, mix, due date); forecasting errors
Responsiveness is the ability of the manufacturing system to
respond to customer requests within a minimal timeframe. The
debate about the responsiveness of manufacturing operations
has been going on for more than two decades, with its origins
in the concept of time compression or time based competition
[3]–[4], and it was later adopted by a range of companies
and academic researchers [5]–[6]. These approaches are then
categorised into three dimensions of responsiveness [7]:
• Product: Customisation point(s), external variety (post-
configuration), internal variety (pre-configuration)
• Process: Production lead times, decoupling point(s)
• Volume: Variability in demand, customer expectations
The ability to mitigate the impact of disruptions are related
to the development of the above identified responsiveness
capabilities. Resilience is a similar but a broader concept.
It is the ability to withstand such unexpected disruptions
and operate smoothly in a volatile environment [8]. In a
recent paper, [9] has identified four distinct stages in building
resilience dealing with disruptions, namely: (i) Awareness,
(ii) Preparation, (iii) Management and (iv) Response.
Two strategies widely used to mitigate or withstand these
disruptions are through (i) redundancies, and (ii) flexibilities
[10]. Redundancy entails keeping some resources in reserve
to respond to disruption, while flexibility entails restructuring
previously existing capacity [11].
Many business continuity plans are based on increasing
redundancy in several facets of the companies operations. The
most common forms of redundancy are safety stock (storage
buffers), multiple (second) suppliers, and deliberately low
capacity utilisation rates [10]. Traditionally, the production
lines are equipped with storage zones (buffers) in different
locations along the system to provide protection against
any disruptions by employing redundancy. Allocation
of buffer size and location in production systems is an
important optimisation problem faced by manufacturing
system designers. An analytical approach to identify a
trade-off between small and large inventory buffers and
their locations to respond to disruptions is discussed in
[8]. Such investments, however, can only go a limited way
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towards addressing disruptions, as they present a cost to
the company with a return that can only be realized in
case of a major disruption. Investing in flexibility, however,
yields many additional benefits for day-to-day operations [10].
Flexibility in the manufacturing context is generally
considered as an adaptive response to environmental
uncertainty [12]–[13]. The ability of a system to adapt to
changing external and internal influences has been recognised
as a source of competitive advantage [14]–[15], which
was widely promoted in the 1990s [16]–[17]. It has been
employed as a weapon to deter new entrants [18]. As
the importance of the ability to adapt to changing market
environments grew, the debate on flexibility provided the
theoretical origin for the concepts of responsiveness [19].
Although the results of increased flexibility are difficult to
measure with traditional accounting and risk management
tools, investment in flexibility can be justified in terms of
the increased sales, reduced costs and increased competitive
advantage that companies can enjoy by developing flexible
operations [10].
The various forms of machine and subsystem flexibilities
found within a production system often represent means
of responding to disruptions [20]. The adoption of flexible
manufacturing systems (FMS) has had significant implications
for manufacturers and market structure [21]–[22]. FMS
can flexibly produce a variety of outcomes using the same
(manufacturing) resources [13]. The strategies discussed in the
literature include late configuration, modularity, postponement
and standardisation [23]–[24]. More recently, research has
highlighted the potential of additive manufacturing (AM)
technology to spark a new industrial revolution by extending
the features of conventional FMS technology [25]–[29]. AM
refers to the process of joining materials to make objects from
3D model data, usually layer upon layer [30]. Colloquially,
AM is often referred to as 3D printing [31]
The main benefit of AM technology is that it enables
the flexible production of customised products without
cost penalties in manufacturing. AM does so by directly
transforming 3D data into physical parts, without any need for
molds or tools. Moreover, the layer-by-layer manufacturing
can consolidate and produce functionally integrated parts in a
single step, hence cutting down the need for assembly. Thus,
AM technology significantly affects the costs of flexibility,
capital costs, personalisation, and marginal production costs
[25], [32]–[33]. The opportunities of AM, however, come
with a number of technical and economic barriers that
preclude its widespread use for commercial applications.
These include a high machine cost, material cost, materials
choices, dimensional accuracy, surface roughness, support
design and removal, low mechanical properties, building
time for large size component [25], [34] [38]. Given these
trade-offs, our paper aims to offer support in evaluating AM
as a profitable means for responding to disruptions before
making technology investment decision.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Next
section provides the review of technology selection techniques.
Section 3 describes a simple extension of an existing game
model in the literature. Section 4 solves this technology
game under appropriate assumptions. The analysis and three
propositions are outlined in section 5 and Section 6 concludes
the paper.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature on the issue of selecting manufacturing
technology in production systems is wide and varied. The
implications of new technological advancements (e.g., CAD,
CNC, automation etc.) have been discussed by researchers in
utilising flexibility as a strategic pillar for the generation of
profit [13], [22]. These investment trade-offs have also been
investigated in other contexts [13], [21]. We focus mainly on
systems utilising AM as a profitable means for mitigating the
effects of downstream disruptions.
At a firm level, the impact of manufacturing technology
can be assessed using one of the most cited model for modern
manufacturing that offers a theoretical foundation to perform
a pay-off analysis [39]. The authors in [34] systematically
adopt this model for AM technology. Their analysis reaffirms
the intuition about the positive impact of AM on the profit of
a monopolist firm i.e. premium priced customised products
at no cost penalties can increase profits as long as the
processing time, marginal costs of production, and defective
batch probability are not high.
At a market structure level, two approaches with a formal
analytical model have been used to study the impact of
conventional FMS that incorporate both manufacturing
flexibility and product differentiation. They are (i) product
attribute address models, and (ii) game-theoretic models for
technology choice. These models have primarily been used
to assess the implication of technology choice (between
dedicated and conventional FMS) [44]–[46], [57]–[59],
however, given AM offers more than a conventional FMS
in terms of both enhanced manufacturing flexibility and
product differentiation [34], we therefore believe that both
product attributes and game theoretic models can be adopted
to discuss the effects of AM technology, as explained below.
It should be noted, however, that the focus of our study is on
the latter game-theoretic model approach.
Within the first product attributes address model approach,
the scholars have examined the impact of (conventional)
FMS on market structure. [44] models this effect by setting
modification costs proportional to the distance between the
base product and the variant, and conclude that flexibility
in production systems promotes the concentration in market
through pre-emption and mergers. The authors in [45] discuss
the strategic aspects of the choice of technology. They
found that firm can discriminate on prices as the price of
one product variant can be independently adjusted without
affecting other variants, thus suggesting that flexibility can
precisely be used to deter entry by locally lowering prices
as and when there is a threat of entry. [34] have adopted
the product attributes models in [44] in light of the four
key principles they identified for the production with AM
technology. The authors have concluded that unlike the case
of conventional FMS in [44], the incentives for mergers
(given a firm with AM enters the market) are also reduced as
AM leads to lower market prices. The authors in [34] also
applied the AM characteristics to the model proposed in [45],
and concluded that in the case of higher AM penetration, the
incumbents no longer has the same strategic advantage (as in
the case of conventional FMS) for deterring market entry by
locally cutting down prices.
For the second approach of game-theoretic models, the
scholars have assessed the choice of dedicated versus
(conventional) flexible manufacturing technology. The
literature relevant to the game-theoretic approaches can be
categorised into two major streams, as is also done by [57]:
the first exploring flexibility as a hedge against demand
uncertainty, and the second studying flexibility as a strategic
weapon under competition.
The first stream within game theoretic approaches consider
the investment choice between dedicated capacity and the
(conventional) flexible capacity in the absence of competition.
It analyses the trade-off between the ability of (conventional)
flexible manufacturing systems to hedge against demand
uncertainty (by manufacturing a range of products) against
the higher cost of flexibility. Without competition, invariably
all papers consider a monopolistic firm. For instance, [18]
assesses the monopolists rationale in a sequential game
between the monopolistic incumbent and a potential entrant
where both have the choice of adopting either flexible or
dedicated manufacturing technology. The authors identify a
zone of strategic flexibility, whereby they treat FMS as a
strategic choice for firms to deter market entry and conclude
that under uncertain consumer preferences, an incumbent
threatened by new market entrants is more likely to install
FMS than an unchallenged monopolist. More recently, again
for a sequential game, [58] shows that for a not so uncertain
environment, it is more profitable for the incumbent to
invest in dedicated production line as a means for deterring
an entrant. A range of authors [46]–[51] have looked into
technology choice with product prices determined by an
exogenous demand curve. [46] models a two-stage game and
conclude that the technology investment decision between
dedicated and (conventional) flexible manufacturing comes
down to the cost differential. [47] studies the notion of
total flexibility against partial flexibility by using a concept
of chaining. [48] develops a similar model and shows that
flexibility is beneficial even with perfect positive correlation
if product margins are different. [52] let the firms set their
product prices and compare the benefits of investment
in flexible against two dedicated technologies under the
assumption that investment costs for the two technologies are
the same. They find that the flexible capacity and expected
profits are increasing in demand variance, and that positive
correlation increases capacity investment while decreasing
expected profits.
The authors in the second stream of literature within game
theory approaches for technology-choice look at the strategic
value of flexibility in the absence of demand uncertainty.
One of the first papers to explore technology adoption under
competition is that of [53], who studies a differential game
between two firms that can acquire new technology to reduce
unit operating cost for a single product (hence, FMS or
AM is outside of the scope of this work). [54]–[55] model
two firms competing with each other in a two-stage game.
First, firms decide on their investment in either flexible (can
enter two markets) or dedicated manufacturing technology
(can enter one market only). Second, firms choose their
output volume for two differentiated product markets. The
fixed costs for investments in FMS are always higher than
or equal to those of dedicated manufacturing technology.
The firms are therefore in a Prisoners dilemma, and hence
these papers show that flexible technology is detrimental to
both firms. [59] however argues that if the two products are
not substitutes as is assumed in [54]–[55], and are in fact
sufficiently complementary, and given the investment cost for
flexible technology is not too large, then both firms investing
flexible technology will benefit themselves simultaneously
and hence prisoner’s dilemma-like situation does not occur.
[57] combines the two streams of game-theoretical
approaches by incorporating both competition and demand
uncertainty in the model to study strategic technology choice
between dedicated and conventional flexible manufacturing
system. Unlike [56] which requires a firm to possess flexible
technology to enter a second market, [57] relaxes this
assumption. This implies that flexibility does not inherently
fuel competition, and hence prices are no longer the lowest
when both firms choose flexible technology. [57] then
demonstrates the effects of demand uncertainty, market size,
product substitutability, and cost on the equilibrium outcomes
under simultaneous move in technology choices. While [57]
shows the possibility of all technology choice combinations
in equilibrium, [58] adopts an incumbent-entrant sequential
structure and shows that the equilibrium where both firms
invest in dedicated technology ceases to exist. With a view
to focus on enhanced flexibility and product differentiation
offered by AM, we adopt the model presented in [57] to
study the technology choice between AM and dedicated
manufacturing. Alongside many common features between
AM and conventional FMS, nevertheless, we note that AM has
its differences from conventional FMS as noted by [34] which
include the higher marginal cost of AM and lower upfront
and fixed cost (set up cost, switching cost etc.) amongst others.
On top of the theoretical studies reviewed above, numerous
scholars have conducted empirical studies, and looked into
the cost models to assess the economic viability of additive
manufacturing against conventional manufacturing [40]–[42].
The two models that receive significant attention are: (i)
Hopkinson and Dickens [40], and (ii) Ruffo et al. [41]. [40]
calculates the average cost per part using AM by dividing the
total cost by the total number of parts manufactured in a year.
The authors break the cost into machine costs, labour costs,
and material costs amongst other (negligible) costs [42].
They calculate the costs for a lever and compare it against
the injection modelling cost, and find a threshold value under
which AM is a more economically viable technology. [41]
however, use an activity based cost model. In their model,
the total cost of a build (C), is the sum of raw material
costs (price/kg*mass) and indirect costs (rate*build time).
The cost per part is calculated as the total cost of a build
(C) divided by the number of parts in the build. While
producing the same lever as produced in [40], [41] indicate
that the time and material used are the main variables in the
costing model. Their model has a jagged saw tooth shape
to it, which is due to the impact of a new line, layer, or
build. Each time one of these is added, average costs increase
irregularly from raw material consumption and process time.
[43] uses the above model to compare the per-assembly
processing cost for a landing gear assembly, and finds that
for production runs of less than 42 units, AM was more
cost effective than the conventional die-casting manufacturing.
These approaches seem to use the cost model without
taking into account the demand they can capture, and by
extension, the potential revenue, which is crucial for realising
the profit in making technology investment decisions. On
the other hand, a game-theoretical approach provides explicit
account on how the market share of each firm also depends
endogenously on the technology profile of the industry,
which improves assessment on the net benefit of switching
technology. This justifies our choice of using game theory for
assessing the technology investment decision in the context
of AM.
For the reasons outlined above, we take the model initially
developed by [57] to assess AM as a strategic choice. We
extend the model from 2- player to n-player to accommodate
industry specific features such as technology penetration rate,
and how the incentive for switching to AM technologies
evolves at different stages of technology adoption in the
market. This enriches the model in [57], and paves the way
for our forthcoming empirical study.
III. THE MODEL
The model is an extension of [57], so we would only
describe its key elements here without repeating the
justification of each assumption. We adopt [57] as the
base model because it captures the decision between two
production technologies which differ in flexibility against
actualized demand; we extend [57] from 2 players to n players
to capture the There are n firms manufacturing two products
(indexed by 1 and 2) and engaging in competition with one
another in both markets. We assume that the firms are risk
neutral and maximize expected profits. In the first stage, each
firm simultaneously chooses to invest in either dedicated
manufacturing technology (d) or additive manufacturing
technology (a).
Depending on the technological choices, 2n subgames
can potentially emerge. In the second stage, each firm i
with additive manufacturing technology invests in a single
production capacity Kai with per unit cost ca, whereas each
firm j with dedicated manufacturing technology invests in its
production capacity for each of the two products Kd1j and
Kd2j with per unit cost cd. We assume the capacity costs to be
homogeneous across firms for simplicity. This can be justified
by assuming reasonable spread of technological knowledge
within the industry.
In the third stage, demands for both products A1 and
A2 are realized. Each firm i chooses its production quantity
qiy for each product y = 1, 2. Let Qy :=
Pn
i=1 qiy be
the total quantity of product y put on the market by the
n firms. The inverse demand function for product y is then
Py(Qy, Q3 y) = Ay   Qy    Q3 y , where   2 ( 1, 1) is
the product substitutability parameter. For y = 1, 2, denote the
mean of Ay by µy interpreted as expected market size, and let
 2T := V ar(A1  A2) be the total demand uncertainty facing
each firm.
IV. SOLVING THE GAME
We adopt the solution concept of subgame-perfect
equilibrium (SPE).
Proposition 1 Fix a subgame in the first stage where
m firms have adopted additive manufacturing technology,
and n   m firms have adopted dedicated manufacturing
technology, for m = 0, 1, ..., n. In the unique SPE of this
subgame, the expected profit of any firm with dedicated
manufacturing technology is
E⇡d(m) =
(µ1 + µ2 + 2mca   2(m+ 1)cd)2




Meanwhile, the expected profit of any firm with additive
manufacturing technology is
E⇡a(m) =
(µ1 + µ2 + 2(n m)cd   2(n m+ 1)ca)2







We start from the third stage. Fix a subgame with firm
1, 2, ...,m having adopted additive manufacturing technol-
ogy, and all other firms dedicated manufacturing technology,
without loss of generality. As in [57], we assume each
firm produces to capacity, and each additive firm always





j=m+1, the realized demand A1 and A2, the ob-




















under the constraint qa1i + qa2i  Kai . For y = 1, 2, this yields
for each addition firm i:
qayi =











Next we proceed to the second stage. With this continuation
response function derived above, the objective of additive firm




















First order condition yields for each additive firm i:
Kai =








(m+ 1)(1 +  )






















yj   cd(Kd1j +Kd2j)
With the expression of (Kai )mi=1 above, this yields for y = 1, 2
and each dedicated firm j:
Kdyj(m) =
µy    µ3 y + (1   )(mca   (m+ 1)cd)
(n+ 1)(1   2)
Apply this back to the expression of Kai , we obtain
Kai (m) =
µ1 + µ2 + 2(n m)cd   2(n m+ 1)ca
(n+ 1)(1 +  )
Substitute the above to the expected profit function of ded-
icated firms and additive firms yields the expressions in
Proposition 1.
[57] has obtained the profit functions for the special case
n = 2. However, their coefficient for (µ1   µ2)2 seems
incorrect, which potentially affects their subsequent claim
regarding the threshold of marginal cost of dedicated manu-
facturing above which switching to the flexible manufacturing
technology becomes profitable. Other than that, the market
size effect, substitutability effect, and stochastic effect they
have identified remain valid in our extension.
V. ANALYSIS
Define the function ⌦(m) := E⇡a(m+1) E⇡d(m), which
can be interpreted as the deviation profit of any dedicated firm
for switching to additive manufacturing technology when m
other firms have adopted additive manufacturing technology.
By definition and Proposition 1, we have
⌦(m) =
2n(cd   ca)
(n+ 1)2(1 +  )




Proposition 2 The deviation profit ⌦(m) of switching from
dedicated manufacturing technology to additive manufacturing
technology, when m other firms are already adopting the
latter, is decreasing in m.
This is straightforward because for m < n,
⌦(m+ 1)  ⌦(m) =  
4n(cd   ca)2
(n+ 1)2(1 +  )
 
(2m+ 5) 2T
2(m+ 2)2(m+ 3)2(1   )
The above expression is obviously negative.
Proposition 2 implies that if a dedicated firm does not
switch to additive manufacturing technology now, its deviation
profit will only be lower in the future when other dedicated
firms have made the switch. Hence, if a dedicated firm
believes the market environment and production cost structure
to be relatively stationary in the future, and the switch to
additive manufacturing technology is unilateral, then it should
switch now instead of waiting for its competitors, unless
switching is not profitable to begin with.
Proposition 3 Suppose demand uncertainty  2T is zero.
Then regardless of how many competitors are adopting
additive manufacturing technology, it is profitable for a
firm to switch from dedicated manufacturing technology to
additive manufacturing technology if and only if the marginal
cost of the former is higher.
This is equivalent to claiming ⌦(m) > 0 if and only if
ca < cd for all m given  2T = 0. From the proof of







µ1 + µ2 + (n  2m  2)cd   (n  2m)ca
0.5(n+ 1)(1 +  )
But then µ1 + µ2 + (n   2m   2)cd   (n   2m)ca must be
positive.
Proposition 3 shows the conventional wisdom of choosing
between dedicated and additive manufacturing technology
is correct under the implicit assumption of zero demand
uncertainty. Now we will study the realistic case of nonzero
demand uncertainty, which justifies the value of game-
theoretic analysis on top of the conventional decision rule.
Proposition 4 Suppose demand uncertainty  2T is nonzero.
Then it is profitable for a firm to switch from dedicated
manufacturing technology to additive manufacturing
technology if and only if the marginal cost of the latter
is lower than some threshold  (m), which is greater than the
dedicated manufacturing marginal cost cd, and increasing in
both cd and  2T . Also, @ (m)/@c
d > 1.
Suppose n = 2m. Then it is straightforward that ⌦(m) > 0
if and only if
ca < cd +
(n+ 1)2(1 +  ) 2T
4n(m+ 2)2(µ1 + µ2   2cd)(1   )
=  (m)
It is obvious  (m) is greater than cd and increasing in both





(n+ 1)2(1 +  )(n  2m) 2T
n(m+ 2)2(µ1 + µ2   2cd)2(1   )
If n 6= 2m, we can rearrange ⌦(m) as a quadratic function in
(ca   cd), then factorize as below.
⌦(m) =
2n(n  2m)
(n+ 1)2(1 +  )
⇥
✓
ca   cd  






ca   cd  




Next, suppose n > 2m. Then ⌦(m) > 0 if and only if
ca > cd +




ca < cd +
µ1 + µ2   2cd
2(n  2m)
[1  (m)] =  (m)
The first inequality is ruled out as it implies Kai (m+1) < 0,
contradiction. But then the upper bound for ca is greater than
cd and increasing in  2T .
Suppose n < 2m. Then ⌦(m) > 0 if and only if
ca > cd +




ca < cd +
µ1 + µ2   2cd
2(n  2m)
[1  (m)] =  (m)
The second inequality implies ca < cd. But then µ1+µ2+
2(n  2m  1)cd > µ1 +µ2 + (n  2m  2)cd   (n  2m)ca,
the latter being positive from the proof of Proposition 3. This
in turn implies the first inequality has a negative RHS, and
hence is always satisfied. But then, again, the upper bound
for ca is greater than cd and increasing in  2T .






Because (1  ) and (n  2m) have the same sign, it is easy
to verify that the above is greater than unity whether n > 2m
or n < 2m.
Once we take demand uncertainty into account, the cost
disadvantage of additive manufacturing technology might be
outweighed by its flexibility advantage, which is unsurpris-
ingly increasing in demand uncertainty. It is also intuitive why
a higher cost of dedicated technology leads to higher tolerance
for the cost of additive technology. The interesting part is that
in the presence of demand uncertainty, the rate of change of
such tolerance with respect to the cost of dedicated technology
is more than one-to-one.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have extended the 2-player technology investment game
presented in [57] to n-player with a view to adapt their model
to accommodate AMs penetration rate in various industries
outlined in Gartner hype cycle. Using our extended model,
we characterised the market conditions under which it is
profitable for a firm to switch to AM technology. We find that
the market size effect, substitutability effect, and stochastic
effect identified in [57] remain valid in our generalisation.
Moreover, in a n-player scenario, if a dedicated firm does
not switch to AM technology now, our model suggests
that its switching profit will only be lower in the future if
other dedicated firms make the switch first. Furthermore,
the conventional wisdom of choosing between DM and
AM technology stands under the implicit assumption of
zero demand uncertainty. However, once we take demand
uncertainty into account in our extended model, we find that
the cost disadvantage of AM technology might be outweighed
by its flexibility advantage, which is increasing in demand
uncertainty.
The model investigated in our analysis has certain limita-
tions nonetheless, as it is only the first step in developing
an industrially acceptable decision support tool, which will
pave the way for a future empirical study. In order to enrich
the theoretical understanding of the economic incentive behind
the technology investment decision, the scenario of decreasing
marginal cost will be examined in future extension to verify
the robustness of our results with respect to changes in the cost
structure. This extension and further analysis is being carried
out in line with the interviews of machine vendors as well as
the end-users which have been completed.
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